THE RISK AND IMPLICATION THAT COGNITIVE BIASES CAN HAVE DURING EXPERT AND METHA EXPERT WORK

Abstract

The proposed hypothesis seeks to determine and answer, whether cognitive biases can influence the expert to the point of controlling and directing his or her expert or meta-expert activity, given that these systematic errors in information processing act from the subconscious, and both expert work within the scope of a judicial process are the antecedent that constitutes ex post evidence. Thus, the hypothesis posed is that such cognitive control misguides the expert, generating erroneous conclusions in his or her reports, which can lead to a judgment with a high degree of untruth. This research is not an experimental study, but rather responds to a reflection from the trialist conception of law, since it is possible to access the phenomenon as an object of study through a socio-normo-axiological understanding, to give plausibility to the posed conjecture. While the premise that the risk of reasoning, not only of the expert, but also of the judge himself who has been impacted by the presence of cognitive biases that have guided the expert or meta-expert work, can effectively be determined by law to the extent of the affectation of the value of justice, while the implication is related to the degree of said affectation in the agents of the system. Thus, as will be seen, by recognizing the value of justice, honesty, transparency, impartiality, among others, the expert should at least ask himself if what he observes, as working material, is defined by what that object of expertise is, or by what his subjective knowledge orders him to believe and assert, or by what science, art or profession dictates according to models and principles, and all of the above, summarized in the way in which each of these possibilities will affect the conclusion he arrives at.