Introduction to the Monographic Section: The Role of Intuitions in Analytic Philosophy

Authors

  • David Bordonaba-Plou Universidad de Valparaíso

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss24pp1-7

Author Biography

David Bordonaba-Plou, Universidad de Valparaíso

Investigador postdoctoral FONDECYT en el Instituto de Humanidades de la Universidad de Valparaíso.

References

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Published

2024-02-29

How to Cite

Bordonaba-Plou, D. (2024). Introduction to the Monographic Section: The Role of Intuitions in Analytic Philosophy. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (24), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss24pp1-7