Introduction to the Monographic Section: The Role of Intuitions in Analytic Philosophy


  • David Bordonaba-Plou Universidad de Valparaíso


Author Biography

David Bordonaba-Plou, Universidad de Valparaíso

Investigador postdoctoral FONDECYT en el Instituto de Humanidades de la Universidad de Valparaíso.


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How to Cite

Bordonaba-Plou, D. (2024). Introduction to the Monographic Section: The Role of Intuitions in Analytic Philosophy. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (24), 1–7.