Mental Privacy as the Basis of Relational Identity and Autonomy

Authors

  • Abel Wajnerman-Paz Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss26pp205-221

Keywords:

Neurotechnologies, Identity, Narratives, Psychological Profiles, Neural Data

Abstract

In recent years, different proposals articulate specific rights for the regulation of neurotechnology, also known as "neurorights". A central concern regarding neurotechnological applications is that of mental privacy. This is the idea that we should have control over access to our neural data and the information about our mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing them. After proposing a detailed conceptualization of mental privacy, I will argue that the protection of this right is relevant because it is at the basis of two fundamental ethical and legal dimensions of persons, identity and autonomy. I claim that mental privacy is presupposed by the relational conception of identity, and that this connection allows us to identify some limitations of current data privacy regulations. I then argue that relational identity is presupposed by the notion of autonomy, and this connection highlights relational dimensions of this concept that are not adequately articulated in current relational theories of autonomous action. This implies that the protection of mental privacy is also necessary for the protection if this second ethical and legal dimension of persons.

References

Agre, P., & Rotenberg, M. (Eds.). (1998). Technology and privacy: The new landscape. Mit Press.

Altman, I. (1975). The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, and Crowding. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.

Altman, I. (1976). A conceptual analysis. Environ. Behav. 8, 7–29. doi: 10.1177/001391657600800102

de Andrade, N. N. G. (2010). Data protection, privacy and identity: distinguishing concepts and articulating rights. In IFIP PrimeLife International Summer School on Privacy and Identity Management for Life (pp. 90-107). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.

Baylis, F. (2012). “The self in situ: a relational account of personal identity,” in Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and Health Law, eds J. Downie, and J. Llewellyn (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press), 109–131.

Brandeis, L., and Warren, S. (1890). The right to privacy. Harv. Law Rev. 4, 193–220.

Chiesa, P. A., Liuzza, M. T., Macaluso, E., and Aglioti, S. M. (2017). Brain activity induced by implicit processing of others' pain and pleasure. Hum. Brain Map. 38, 5562–5576. doi: 10.1002/hbm.23749

Custers, B. (2012). Predicting Data that People Refuse to Disclose. Privacy Observatory Magazine, (3).

Goering, S., Klein, E., Sullivan, L. S., Wexler, A., y Arcas, B. A., Bi, J., et al. (2021). Recommendations for Responsible Development and Application of Neurotechnologies. Neuroethics, 1–22. doi: 10.1007/s12152-021-09468-6

Goffman, E. (1978). The presentation of self in everyday life(Vol. 21). London: Harmondsworth.

Van Den Berg, B., & Leenes, R. (2010). Audience segregation in social network sites. In 2010 IEEE Second International Conference on Social Computing (pp. 1111-1116). IEEE.

Hildebrandt, M. (2006). “Privacy and Identity”. In: Claes, E., Duff, A., Gutwirth, S. (eds.) Privacy and the Criminal Law, p. 199. Intersentia, Hart Pub., Antwerpen, Oxford.

Ienca, M., and Andorno, R. (2017a). A New Category of Human Rights: Neurorights. Research in Progress [Online]. Available Online at: from: http://blogs.biomedcentral.com/bmcblog/2017/04/26/new-category-humanrights-

Neurorights.

Ienca, M., and Andorno, R. (2017b). Towards new human rights in the age of neuroscience and neurotechnology. Life Sci. Soc. Pol. 13:5.

Ienca, M. (2021). On neurorights. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 15.

Kosinski, M., Stillwell, D., & Graepel, T. (2013). Private traits and attributes are predictable from digital records of human behavior. Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 110(15), 5802-5805.

Neethling, J. (2005). Personality rights: a comparative overview. Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, 38(2), 210-245.

Rissman, J., Greely, H. T., and Wagner, A. D. (2010). Detecting individual memories through the neural decoding of memory states and past experience. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107, 9849–9854. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1001028107

Rouvroy, A. (2008). Privacy, Data Protection, and the Unprecedented Challenges of Ambient Intelligence. Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2(1), 51.

Wajnerman Paz, A. (2021). Is Mental Privacy a Component of Personal Identity?. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 604.

Wajnerman Paz, A. (2022). Is your neural data part of your mind? Exploring the conceptual basis of mental privacy. Minds and Machines, 32(2), 395-415.

Wernicke, M., Hofter, C., Jordan, K., Fromberger, P., Dechent, P., and Müller, J. L. (2017). Neural correlates of subliminally presented visual sexual stimuli. Conscious. Cognit. 49, 35–52. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.12.011

Westin, A. F. (1968). Privacy and freedom. Washington Lee Law Rev. 25:166.

Yuste, R., Genser, J., and Herrmann, S. (2021). It’s Time for Neuro-Rights. Horizons

J. Int. Relat. Sustain. Dev. 2021, 154–165.

Yuste, R., Goering, S., Bi, G., Carmena, J. M., Carter, A., Fins, J. J., et al. (2017).

Four ethical priorities for neurotechnologies and AI. Nat. News 551, 159–163.

doi: 10.1038/551159a

Published

2024-09-24

How to Cite

Wajnerman-Paz, A. (2024). Mental Privacy as the Basis of Relational Identity and Autonomy . Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (26), 205–221. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss26pp205-221

Issue

Section

Articles

Similar Articles

1 2 3 > >> 

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.