Relational Ironism: Personal Identity and Memory Loss

Authors

  • Dominique Waissbluth Kingma Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2023iss23pp239-257

Keywords:

narrative identity, Alzheimer’s disease, relationalism, patient care, bioethics, philosophy of medicine

Abstract

The analysis of identity in cases of memory loss, particularly in Alzheimer’s disease, sheds light on relevant philosophical and practical concerns, such as decision-making processes, autonomy, and the improvement of interaction with patients. Literature on psychological continuity recognizes identity when there are no disruptions in memory, which is certainly not the case in Alzheimer´s disease. Narrative identity, particularly in its relational and non-relational versions, delivers tools which are not exempt from difficulties. Either the caregivers’ narrative or the patient’s narrative is dismissed. Furthermore, if there is a contradiction of narratives in relational theories, we are advised to either find the best narrative or seek agreement. However, one option rejects one narrative, while the other is unattainable in practice for the case in question. Hence, we propose drawing from ironism (Rorty, 1989), which suggests duality of dialogues when dealing with problems. This will be used to defend that the narratives of both, a person with Alzheimer and those close to them, are valid when constituting identity of the former. In this case, we will articulate and defend relational ironism, which allows us to embrace inconsistent narratives without seeking agreements. According to this, personal identity in this case is in constant tension between the narratives of those who suffer Alzheimer’s disease and the narratives of those close to them. We close illustrating possible benefits for how best to interact with patients.

References

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Published

2023-12-26

How to Cite

Waissbluth Kingma, D. (2023). Relational Ironism: Personal Identity and Memory Loss. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (23), 239–257. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2023iss23pp239-257

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