Truth as Identity

Authors

  • Sebastián Briceño Universidad de Santiago de Chile

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2023iss23pp225-238

Keywords:

truth, propositions, thinkables, facts, states of affairs, identity, correspondence

Abstract

Mi objetivo en este artículo es defender el núcleo esencial de las teorías de la verdad que entienden la verdad como identidad, a saber: que el portador de verdad es el hacedor de verdad. En particular, me interesa defender la versión de Hornsby (1997) y McDowell (1994) en contra de los ataques realizados por Dodd (1995; 1999; 2008). Mi defensa es aplicable a versiones previas pertenecientes a esta familia de teorías, especialmente a la de Moore (1899; 1902).

References

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Published

2023-12-26

How to Cite

Briceño, S. (2023). Truth as Identity. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (23), 225–238. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2023iss23pp225-238

Issue

Section

Articles