Open Naturalism and Two Types of Intuition


  • Esteban Céspedes Universidad Católica del Maule



realism, representation, phenomenon, naturalism, ontology


As a non-representationalist form of integrating methodological naturalism with ontological naturalism, this work proposes a distinction between phenomenic and rational intuitions. Since this is not a static distinction, it offers a way of observing in which sense the apparent circularity between mental and theoretical representations is not a vicious one. The argument’s plausibility will have to be reinforced through considerations about the unstability of ontologies and about how to conceive conflicting intuitions.


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How to Cite

Céspedes, E. (2024). Open Naturalism and Two Types of Intuition. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (24), 25–43.

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