Subtracting Suffering: An Anti-Aggregationist Approach to Suffering in Nature
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss26pp243-267Keywords:
agregacionismo, antiagregacionismo, ética animal, sufrimiento animal, intervencionismoAbstract
In recent years, there is an increasingly higher number of people who believe in a prevalence of suffering over welfare in nature. This belief is usually coincident with a sentiocentric axiology according to which what is morally relevant are the mental states of pleasure and pain. This combination leads to the diagnosis that the prevalence of suffering has an enormous moral significance. This paper rejects this traditional line of thought and instead argues that could not be coherent. The claim that there is an ontological prevalence, in the abstract, of suffering in nature is unproblematic. However, the same is not true when considering its moral relevance. A sentiocentrist cannot consider an aggregationist calculation to be morally valuable, strictly speaking, since there is no subject that feels it. Nevertheless, the need for positive intervention in nature with the aim of reducing existing suffering could remain.
References
Altman, A. (2016). Discrimination. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/discrimination/ (Consulted June 30, 2023).
Benatar, D. (2006). Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dawkins, R. (1995). River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life. New York: Basic Books.
Faria, C., & Paez, E. (2014). Anthropocentrism and Speciesism: Conceptual and Normative Issues. Revista de Bioética y Derecho, 32, 95-103.
Faria, C. (2016). Animal Ethics Goes Wild: The Problem of Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature. Doctoral Dissertation, Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Glover, J., & Scott-Taggart, M. J. (1975). It Makes no Difference Whether or Not I Do It. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 49, 171-209.
Hardin. R. (2008). Utilitarian Aggregation. Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation, 26, 30-47.
Hirose, I. (2013). Aggregation and the Separateness of Persons. Utilitas, 25, 182-205.
Hirose, I. (2015). Moral Aggregation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Horta, O. (2010a). Debunking the Idyllic View of Natural Processes: Population Dynamics and Suffering in the Wild. Télos, 17(1), 73–88.
Horta, O. (2010b). Disvalue in Nature and Intervention: The Fox, the Rabbit and the Vegan Food Rations. Pensata Animal, 34.
Horta, O. (2010c). What is Speciesism? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 23, 243-266.
Horta, O. (2015). The Problem of Evil in Nature: Evolutionary Bases of the Prevalence of Disvalue. Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism, 3(1), 17-32.
Horta, O. (2017). Animal Suffering in Nature: The Case for Intervention. Environmental Ethics, 39, 261-279.
Horta, O. (2018). Moral Considerability and the Argument from Relevance. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 31(3), 369-388.
Kamm, F. M. (1998). Are There Irrelevant Utilities? In Morality, Mortality, Vol. I: Death and Whom to Save from It, New York: Oxford University Press, 144-164.
Knutsson, S. (2017). How Could an Empty World Be Better than a Populated One? Foundational Research Institute, https://foundational-research.org/how-could-an-empty-world-be-better-than-a-populated/. (Consulted June 30, 2023).
McMahan, J. (1996). Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25, 3-35.
McMahan, J. (2002). The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mill, J. S. (2003). Utilitarianism and On Liberty. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Ng, Y.-K. (1995). Towards Welfare Biology: Evolutionary Economics of Animal Consciousness and Suffering. Biology and Philosophy, 10(3), 255-285.
Norcross, A. (1997). Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 26, 135-167.
Norcross, A. (2009). Two dogmas of Deontology: Aggregation, Rights, and the Separateness of Persons. Social Philosophy and Policy, 26(1), 76-95.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Parfit, D. (1978). Innumerate Ethics. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 7(4), 285-301.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. New York: Clarendon Press.
Parfit, D. (2003). Justifiability to Each Person. Ratio, 16, 368-390.
Pluhar, E. (1996). Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Durham: Duke University Press.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rolston III, H. (1992). Disvalues in Nature. The Monist, 75(2), 250-278.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Sidgwick, H. (1981). The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
Singer, P. (1990). Animal Liberation. New York: Random House.
Taurek, J. M. (1977). Should the Numbers Count? Philosophy & Public Affairs, 6, 293-316.
Temkin, L. S. (2005). A “New” Principle of Aggregation. Philosophical Issues, 15, 218-234.
Temkin, L. S. (2008). Aggregation within Lives. Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation, 26, 1-29.
Temkin, L. S. (2012). Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tomasik, B. (2014). How Many Wild Animals Are There? Essays on Reducing Suffering, http://reducing-suffering.org/how-many-wild-animals-are-there/. (Consulted June 30, 2023).
Tomasik, B. (2015). The Importance of Wild-Animal Suffering. Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, 3, 133-152.
Tomasik, B. (2016). The Importance of Insect Suffering. Essays on Reducing Suffering, https://reducing-suffering.org/the-importance-of-insect-suffering/. (Consulted June 30, 2023).
Vallentyne, P. (2005). Of Mice and Men: Equality and Animals. The Journal of Ethics, 9, 403-433.
Villamor, A. (2018). The Overwhelming Prevalence of Suffering in Nature. Revista de Bioética y Derecho, 42, 181-195.
Višak, T. (2013). Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics. Basignstone: Palgrave MacMillan.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2024 Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso y Universidad de Valparaíso
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
- Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication, with the work after publication simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International) that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).
