The Expertise Defense and Experimental Philosophy of Free Will


  • Kiichi Inarimori Department of Philosophy, Hokkaido University Center for Human Nature, Artificial Intelligence and Neuro Science, Hokkaido University



comprehension error, philosophical intuition, metaphilosophy, moral judgment, philosophical expertise


This paper aims to vindicate the expertise defense in light of the experimental philosophy of free will. My central argument is that the analogy strategy between philosophy and other domains is defensible, at least in the free will debate, because philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuition by enabling expert philosophers to understand philosophical issues correctly and to have philosophical intuitions about them. This paper will begin by deriving two requirements on the expertise defense from major criticisms of it. First, precisely how philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuitions requires explanation (Contribution); second, it must be explained how philosophical training immunizes philosophical intuitions from distorting factors (Immunity). I shall argue that the Contribution requirement is crucial for the expertise defense and that this requirement can be satisfied at least in the domain of free will: recent research shows that most novices are unable to understand determinism correctly, suggesting that having intuitions about determinism requires philosophical expertise. I then discuss how this proposal can be applied to other philosophical disciplines.


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How to Cite

Inarimori, K. (2024). The Expertise Defense and Experimental Philosophy of Free Will. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (24), 125–143.

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