Extended Subjectivity, Conveyance of Cognitions and Community of Minds: About the Possibility of One’s Reasons become other’s Intuitions

Authors

  • Luis Alberto Carrillo Cáceres Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss24pp163-182

Keywords:

holism, intuitive belief, extended cognition, intuitive assistant, extended reasons

Abstract

The holist and inferential condition that, according with Davidson, defines imperatively the cognitive process collides with the existence of the intuitive believes, that is to say, those believes that are of themselves the fundamentum and that, thus, don’t require other belief for their grounds. Nonetheless, if, for one part, is adopted the way in which Peirce understands the term “intuition” and, for another, is accepted the extension of inferential holism, is allowed, even so, to admit the existence of intuitive believes, without transgressing the Davidsonian prohibition. Indeed, if the inferential basis of supported belief is located beyond of the individual agency of who support that belief, the very belief would count as intuition of the agent and would respect the Davidsonian holist constraint, in the sense that such a belief would be a belief whose basis would be in another belief, even when that belief was one that was in an external agency. The key for to accomplish this purpose is to sustain a reasoning extended theory —analogous to the Clark and Chalmers (1998) extended theory of mind—, by virtue of which the agent can obtain, from an intuitive assistant —as alien inferential authorship — what he cannot get by his own inferential authorship. Precisely, in this work we will expound a Davidsonian type of linguistic interaction model —namely, dialogic and triangular—, for cognitions persuasive transfer, by means of one’s reasons (the assistant) become other’s intuitions (the assisted).

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Published

2024-02-29

How to Cite

Carrillo Cáceres, L. A. (2024). Extended Subjectivity, Conveyance of Cognitions and Community of Minds: About the Possibility of One’s Reasons become other’s Intuitions. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (24), 163–182. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss24pp163-182

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