The Moral Mind: How 5 Sets of Innate Moral Intuitions Guide the Development of Many Culture Specific Virtues, and Perhaps Even Modules (Translation of published paper)

Abu-Lughod, L. (1986). Veiled sentiments. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Aristotle. (1941). Nichomachean ethics. In R. McKeon (Ed.), The basic works of Aristotle, pp. 927-1112. New York: Random House.

Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J. (Eds.) (1992). The Adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. New York: Oxford.

Baron, Jonathan (1993). Morality and rational choice. Springer-Verlag.

Batson, C. D., O’Quinn, K., Fulty, J., Vanderplass, M., Isen, A. M. (1983). Influence of self-reported distress and empathy on egoistic versus altruistic motivation to help. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 706-718.

Boehm, C. (1999). Hierarchy in the forest: The evolution of egalitarian behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained: The evolutionary origins of religious thought. New York: Basic.

Bruner, Jerome (1986). Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Buller, D. J. (2005). Adapting minds: Evolutionary psychology and the persistent quest for human nature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

Buller, D. J., Hardcastle, V. G. (2000). Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: Against promiscuous modularity. Brain and Mind, 1, 307-325.

Burns, K. (1997). Lewis & Clark - The Journey of the Corps of Discovery. (Movie).

Buss, D. M. (2004). Evolutionary psychology: The new science of the mind. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Carruthers, Michael (1991). Narrativity: Mind-reading and making societies. In Andrew Whiten (Ed.), Natural theories of mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading, pp. 317-331. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Carruthers, P. (n/d). Moderately massive modularity. Available on the Internet at http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Moderate-modularity.htm.

Casebeer, W. D. (2003). Natural ethical facts: evolution, connectionism, and moral cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cervone, D., Shoda, Y. (Eds.) (1999). The coherence of personality: Social-cognitive bases of consistency, variability, and organization. New York: Guilford Press.

Churchland, P. M. (1996). The engine of reason, the seat of the soul: a philosophical journey into the brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Churchland, P. M. (1998). Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues. Topoi, 17, 83-96.

Clark, A. (2000). Word and action: reconciling rules and know-how in moral cognition. In R. Campbell and B. Hunter, eds., Moral Epistemology Naturalized, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary volume XXVI.

Coulter, A. (2003). Treason: Liberal treachery from the cold war to the war on terror. Crown.

de Waal, F. (1996). Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Darley, J. M., Batson, C. D. (1973). From Jerusalem to Jericho: A study of situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 27, 100-108.

Dewey, John (1922). Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology. New York: Holt.

Doris, J. (1998). Persons, situations, and virtue ethics. Nous, 32(4), 504-530.

Dunbar, R. I. M. (1993). Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and language in humans. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 16, 681-735.

Eliade, M. (1957/1959). The sacred and the profane: The nature of religion. San Diego: Harcourt Brace.

Fiske, A. P. (1991). Structures of social life. New York: Free Press.

Fiske, A. P. (1992). Four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified theory of social relations. Psychological Review, 99, 689-723.

Fiske, A. P. (2004). Relational Models Theory 2.0. In N. Haslam (Ed.), Relational models theory: A contemporary overview, pp. 3-25. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Greene, J., Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 517-523.

Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI study of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.

Griffiths, P. (2002). What is innateness? The Monist, 85(1), 70-85.

Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814-834.

Haidt, J., Bjorklund, F. (2008). Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology, Vol. 2. The cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity, pp. 181-217. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Haidt, J., Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research, 20, 98-116.

Haidt, J., Graham, J. (2009). Planet of the Durkheimians, where community, authority, and sacredness are foundations of morality. In J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.), Social and psychological bases of ideology and system justification, pp. 371-401. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195320916.003.015

Haidt, J., Hersh, M. A. (2001). Sexual morality: The cultures and reasons of liberals and conservatives. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31, 191-221.

Haidt, J., Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. Daedalus, Fall, 55-66.

Haidt, J., Koller, S., Dias, M. (1993). Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 613-628.

Haidt, J., Rozin, P., McCauley, C. R., Imada, S. (1997). Body, psyche, and culture: The relationship between disgust and morality. Psychology and Developing Societies, 9, 107-131.

Hampshire, S. (1982). Morality and convention. In A. Sen and B. Williams (Eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond, pp. 145-158. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hansen, C. (1991). Classical Chinese Ethics. In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion to ethics, pp. 69-81. Oxford, UK: Oxford.

Harman, G. (1999). Moral philosophy meets social psychology: Virtue ethics and the fundamental attribution error. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315-32.

Hartshorne, H., May, M. A. (1928). Studies in the nature of character. Vol. 1: Studies in deceit. New York: MacMillan.

Haslam, N. (1997). Four grammars for primate social relations. In J. A. Simpson & D. T. Kenrick (Eds.), Evolutionary social psychology, pp. 297-316. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Hauser, M. (2006). Moral Minds: How nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong. New York: Harper Collins.

Jensen, L. A. (1997). Culture wars: American moral divisions across the adult lifespan. Journal of Adult Development, 4, 107-121.

Jensen, L. A. (1998). Moral divisions within countries between orthodoxy and progressivism: India and the United States. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37, 90-107.

Kelly, D. y Stich, S. (2007). Two Theories About the Cognitive Architecture Underlying Morality. En P. Carruthers, S. Laurence y S. Stich, (Eds.), The Innate Mind, Vol. 3 Foundations and the Future. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kelly, D., Stich, S., Haley, K., Eng, S., Fessler, D. (2007). Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction. Mind and Language, 22(2), 117-131.

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization. In D. Goslin, (Ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, pp. 347-480. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

MacIntyre, A. (1981). After virtue. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Marler, P. (1991). The instinct to learn. In Susan Carey and Rochel Gelman (eds.), The epigenesis of mind, pp. 37-66. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.

Marcus, G. (2004). The birth of the mind. New York: Basic Books.

May, L., Friedman, M., Clark, A. (Eds.). (1995). Mind and morals: Essays on ethics and cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

McDowell, J. (1979). Virtue and reason. Monist 62, 331-350.

Meigs, A. (1984). Food, sex, and pollution: A New Guinea religion. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Merritt, M. (2000). Virtue ethics and situationist personality psychology. Ethical theory and moral practice, 3, 365-83.

Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment. New York: Wiley.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1993). Non-relative virtues: an Aristotelian approach. In M. C. Nussbaum & A. Sen (Eds.), The quality of life, pp. 242-269. New York: Oxford University Press.

Redding, R. E. (2001). Sociopolitical diversity in psychology: The case for pluralism. American Psychologist, 56, 205-215.

Robert A. Pape (2005). Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. New York: Random House.

Parish, S. M. (1994). Moral knowing in a Hindu sacred city. New York: Columbia University Press.

Petrinovich, L., O’Neill, P., Jorgensen, M. (1993). An empirical study of moral intuitions: Toward an evolutionary ethics. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 467-478.

Piaget, J. (1965/1932). The moral judgement of the child. New York: Free Press.

Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. New York: Norton.

Pincoffs, E. L. (1986). Quandaries and virtues: Against reductivism in ethics. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas.

Richerson, P. J., Boyd, R. (1998). The evolution of human ultra-sociality. In I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt & F. K. Salter (Eds.), Indoctrinability, ideology, and warfare: Evolutionary perspectives, pp. 71-95. New York: Berghahn.

Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ross, L., Nisbett, R. E. (1991). The person and the situation. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Rozin, P., Fallon, A. (1987). A perspective on disgust. Psychological Review, 94, 23-41.

Rozin, P., Haidt, J., McCauley, C. R. (2000). Disgust. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of emotions, pp. 637-653. New York: Guilford Press.

Samuels, R. (2004). Innateness in cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 136-141.

Scanlon, T. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Seligman, M. E. P. (1971). Phobias and preparedness. Behavior Therapy, 2, 307-320.

Shweder, R. (1990). In defense of moral realism: Reply to Gabennesch. Child Development, 61, 2060-2067.

Shweder, R. A. (1990). Cultural psychology: What is it? In J. W. Stigler, R. A. Shweder & G. Herdt (Eds.), Cultural psychology: Essays on comparative human development, pp. 1-43. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shweder, R. A., Balle-Jensen, L., Goldstein, W. M. (1995). Who sleeps by whom revisited: A method for extracting the moral goods implicit in practices. In J. Goodnow, P. Miller & F. Kessel (Eds.), Cultural practices as contexts for development, pp. 21-39. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Shweder, R. A., Mahapatra, M., Miller, J. (1987). Culture and moral development. In J. Kagan & S. Lamb (Eds.), The emergence of morality in young children, pp. 1-83. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shweder, R. A., Much, N. C. (1991). Determinations of meaning: Discourse and moral socialization. In R. A. Shweder (Ed.), Thinking through cultures, pp. 186-240. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Shweder, R. A., Much, N. C., Mahapatra, M., Park, L. (1997). The “big three” of morality (autonomy, community, and divinity), and the “big three” explanations of suffering. In A. Brandt & P. Rozin (Eds.), Morality and health, pp. 119-169. New York: Routledge.

Smith, C. (2003). Moral, believing animals: Human personhood and culture. Oxford, UK: Oxford.

Sperber, D. (1994). The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture, pp. 39-67. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sperber, D. (2005). Modularity and relevance: How can a massively modular mind be flexible and context-sensitive? In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich (Eds.), The innate mind: Structure and contents, pp. 53-68. New York: Oxford.

Sperber, D., Hirschfeld, L. A. (2004). The cognitive foundations of cultural stability and diversity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 40-46.

Sreenivasan, G, (2002). Errors about errors: Virtue theory and trait attribution. Mind, 111, 47-68.

Sripada, C. S., Stich, S. (2006). A framework for the psychology of norms. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (Eds.), The innate mind Vol. 2. Culture and cognition, pp. 280-301. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1(2), 149-178.

Tooby, J., Cosmides, L., Barrett, C. (2005). Resolving the debate on innate ideas: Learnability constraints and the evolved interpenetration of motivational and conceptual functions. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich (Eds.), The innate mind: Structure and contents, pp. 305-337. New York: Oxford.

Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35-57.

Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Turiel, E., Killen, M., Helwig, C. C. (1987). Morality: Its structure, function, and vagaries. In J. Kagan & S. Lamb (Eds.), The emergence of morality in young children, pp. 155-243. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Valdesolo, P., DeSteno, D. (2006). Manipulations of emotional context shape moral judgment. Psychological Science, 17, 476-477.

Wimsatt, W. C. (1999). Generativity, entrenchment, evolution, and innateness: Philosophy, evolutionary biology, and the conceptual foundations of science. In V. G. Hardcastle (Ed.), Where biology meets psychology: Philosophical essays, pp. 139-180. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Zahn-Waxler, C., Radke-Yarrow, M., King, R. (1979). Child rearing and children’s prosocial initiations toward victims of distress. Child Development, 50, 319-330.