Under- and Overspecification in Moral Foundation Theory. The Problematic Search for a Moderate Version of Innatism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp163-179Keywords:
human nature, evolution, social intuitionism, philosophy of mind, intuition, political philosophyAbstract
Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundation Theory has been criticized on many fronts, mainly on account of its lack of evidence concerning the genetic and neurological bases of the evolved moral intuitions that the theory posits. Despite the fact that Haidt’s theory is probably the most promising framework from which to integrate the different lines of interdisciplinary research that deal with the evolutionary foundations of moral psychology, i) it also shows a critical underspecification concerning the precise mental processes that instantiate the triggering of our evolved moral intuitions, and that ii) that underspecification coexists with and overspecification of the structure of human nature when it comes to exploring alternatives to capitalist societies.
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