Social Intuitionism and Dual Reasoning Theory




intuition, emotion, reason, judgment, moral


In this work the social intuitionism defended by Jonathan Haidt is explored and compared with the dual reasoning theory (TDR), this theory belongs to a family of proposals that maintain that there is a duality in the field of the mental. On the one hand, social intuitionism has argued that it receives support from TDR, on the other hand, TDR has pointed out similarities with social intuitionism; despite the mutual references mentioned, an analysis of what the precise relationship between these projects could be has not been carried out. This work is an attempt to carry out such analysis, in which it is argued that a) it is not clear that the division of social intuitionism between reasoning, intuition, and emotion is equivalent to that of the defenders of TDR; b) social intuitionism has certain differences both with the default-interventionist version and with the parallel version of the TDR; and, finally, c) it is not evident that social intuitionism is an extension of a TDR to the field of moral judgment. It is necessary to carry out more studies that delve into the different elements of social intuitionism and TDR, in order to understand how human beings make judgments and decisions, either within the scope of morality or outside it.


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How to Cite

García Campos, J. (2022). Social Intuitionism and Dual Reasoning Theory. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (19), 271–292.



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