Following the path of Hume. Humean Resonances of the Social Intuitionist Model by Jonathan Haidt
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp43-62Keywords:
intuitionism, rationalism, emotions, moral judgment, ethical naturalismAbstract
Jonathan Haidt has exhibited in several publications a strong influence by Hume as his inspiration to build up his Intuitionist Social Model especially in reference to the emotional and intuitive roots of morals. So, this article aims to go deeper into that influence to analyze, review and compare their concepts and hypotheses in order to establish common features in both Philosophers´ programs. By demonstrating some similarities between both authors -both critical to rationalism, and compelled to investigate the roots of morals in Psychology-, their proposals will be compared and analyzed; and taking these critics into account the intuitionist assumptions that both Philosophers assume or could assume will be revised. In order to focus on the motivation of moral statements as a priority in Haidt research, the core of this article is dedicated to that issue. I will also explore Hume’s difficulty to conciliate his Emotivism with the rightness of moral statements that he considered necessary. Finally, my conclusions are that both positions sustain normative consequences ruled by an Ethics of Virtue.
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