Gottlob Frege: Phenomenology to Platonism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2014iss4pp21-32Keywords:
Frege, Platonism, Lotze, HusserlAbstract
Frege’s account, according to which the problem of how thoughts (Gedanken) are apprehended should be a part of psychology, has led scholars to the idea that every consideration regarding subjectivity is absent in this author. From the latter follows a certain way of conceiving the relation between Frege and Husserl which establishes an absolute chasm between both authors regarding the topic mentioned. In the present contribution an extremely different view is defended, namely, that Frege plays an intermediate role between 19th century Platonism and husserlian phenomenology. The main focus of the argument is the commitment between naturalism and idealism which characterizes Platonism before Frege and the beginning of its overcoming carried out by him.
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
- Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication, with the work after publication simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International) that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).
