Guerilla Psychoanalysis. On Generic and Impure Psychoanalysis

Psicoanálisis de guerrilla. Del psicoanálisis genérico e impuro

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Abstract
In dealing with the radical politicization of psychoanalysis from a geopolitical standpoint, this essay argues that psychoanalysis has to be capable to rethink and rebody itself with every contingent and immanent dislocations of its transcendental horizons. Through a reading of Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou on Mao Tse-Tung, we can think about the notion of dislocation and localization of the Idea. We will argue that this has historically happened in psychoanalysis in the transition from Freud to Lacan; however, the issue is that this dislocation has undergone a retroactivity of necessity which makes a vanishing mediator out of the contingent scrap of reality that it initially relied on—and this forms the quilting point of the contemporary Lacanian ideology. Through Gabriel Tupinambá’s The Desire of Psychoanalysis, we will inspect the notion of generic psychoanalysis. We will insist that while generic psychoanalysis is crucial for the refiguring of psychoanalytic politics in a dislocative matter, we need to take this outlook to the end onto a psychoanalysis that is willing to impurify itself through localization as this is the only psychoanalysis worthy of the name.

Keywords: psychoanalysis, generic, impure, conceptualization, actualization, philosophy, Marxism, ideology, dislocation, reconfiguration.

Resumen
En dialogo con la politización radical del psicoanálisis desde un punto de vista geopolítico, este ensayo argumenta que el psicoanálisis tiene que ser capaz de repensarse y re-corporarse a sí mismo con cada dislocación contingente e inmanente de sus horizontes trascendentales. A través de una lectura de Slavoj Žižek y Alain Badiou sobre Mao Tse-Tung, podemos pensar...
la noción de dislocación y localización de la Idea. Argumentaremos que esto ha sucedido históricamente en el psicoanálisis en la transición de Freud a Lacan; sin embargo, la cuestión es que esta dislocación ha sufrido una retroactividad de la necesidad que hace un mediador que se desvanece de la chatarra contingente de la realidad en la que inicialmente se apoyó, y esto forma el punto de acolchado de la ideología lacaniana contemporánea. A través de The Desire of Psychoanalysis de Gabriel Túpinamba, inspeccionaremos la noción de psicoanálisis genérico. Insistiremos en que, si bien el psicoanálisis genérico es crucial para la refiguración de la política psicoanalítica en un asunto dislocador, necesitamos llevar esta perspectiva hasta el final en un psicoanálisis que esté dispuesto a impurificarse a sí mismo a través de la localización, ya que éste es el único psicoanálisis digno de ese nombre.

Palabras clave: psicoanálisis, genérico, impuridad, conceptualización, actualización, filosofía, Marxismo, ideología, dislocación, reconfiguración.

1. Introduction. Psychoanalysis and its discontents

Psychoanalysis keeps stumbling against a wall—it is too sexist, it is too homophobic, it is too racist, it is too transphobic, it is too Eurocentric, it is simply too much. Although oftentimes, there is a certain degree of caricature in these allegations about psychoanalysis, there is clearly an excess that psychoanalysis is struggling to catch up with. To this extent, there is an element of truth to the discontents of psychoanalysis. We could even call this a symptom of psychoanalysis that psychoanalysis has to come to terms with, as this element of truth is an invitation into letting psychoanalysis lose itself into truth and come out the end re-embodied.

The state of Lacanian psychoanalysis today couldn’t add much more pressure to this tension. In 2021, the release of Gabriel Túpinamba’s The Desire of Psychoanalysis (2021) was met with an extensive polemic between political theorists, psychoanalysts, philosophers, and anyone in between. Among these polemics, we find some claims resurfacing such as: psychoanalysis is too clinical, philosophy is too theoretical, politics is too sporadic. However, what is missed in this knot is the fundamental tie between all three of these topics. As Alenka Zupančič notes these cross-pollinations in an interview with Agon Hamza and Frank Ruda (2019, pp. 436-437):

One of the predominant ways or strategies with which psychoanalysts today aim at preserving their ‘scientific’ standing, is by trying to disentangle themselves from philosophy (or theory), returning as it were to pure clinic… the main targets are rather people whose ‘theorizing’ has effects, impact, and makes waves (outside the purely academic territories). They are accused of playing a purely self-serving, sterile game. I see this as profoundly symptomatic… confrontation, opposition between philosophy (or theory) and clinic is in my view a very unproductive one… They are obviously not
the same, but their often very critical dialogue shouldn’t obfuscate the fact that there are also ‘sisters in arms.

The crux of the matter is that while politics, psychoanalysis, and philosophy are neither the same nor should they be conflated as the same; their interaction is nevertheless a crucial state of affairs to their own aims. In regard to Lacanian psychoanalysis itself, such an interaction requires a systematic transplantation that require us to note that the Lacanian movement under Jacques-Alain Miller has remained in a deadlock concerning the politics of psychoanalysis. At once Miller reassures us of a certain apolitical distance of psychoanalysis, while at the same time disavowing an implicit politics. This is instantiated in the instance of his “docile to trans” essay where he fires back at Paul B. Preciado’s appeal to psychoanalysts to account for trans and queer reformulations of sexuality (Preciado, 2021). At once, the Miller’s response is condemning Preciado for inciting a polemic while being able to offer nothing but polemic itself; Miller treats transness as an ideology, but he is unable to catch the bounds of his own ideology in reducing the psychoanalytic treatment of transness as the treatment of an ideological temper tantrum (Miller, 2021; Dupont, 2022).

Similar episodes are recalled by Slavoj Žižek in his foreword to The Desire of Psychoanalysis. While Žižek notes that Miller’s political mobilization against Marine Le Pen was in fact a masked mobilization against the left, he also highlights the early 1980s when Miller proposed the next congress to be held in Buenos Aires while Argentina was amid a military dictatorship. Though this decision favoured the Argentinian analysts who claimed that they would be subordinated if the congress would take place elsewhere insofar as they would have to travel to attend, Miller’s choice did not budge to the situation of exiled Argentinian analysts who would have at least been able to attend the congress elsewhere. Thus, Žižek concludes that “military rule was fine for Miller as long as it was capable of tolerating analytic business.” (Žižek, 2021, pp. xv-xvi). Nonetheless, Žižek is quick to remind us that this is not an isolated affair for psychoanalysis, as in the instance of Austria 1934 where the psychoanalytic

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1 Although I have my personal reservations with respect to Preciado’s arguments pertaining to Freud and Lacan, I still believe that there is a significant listening that psychoanalysts must be attentive to with respect to this piece and its surrounding polemic.

2 One can highlight Miller’s treatment of transness as an ideology when he refers to the need for “Bogeymen to animate your trans troupe, which is not all trans at all”—ironically, Miller’s move recalls Žižek’s theory of racist and antisemitic ideology relying on an objet a to sustain their racist fantasy. Laurent Dupont makes this pure ideologization of trans issues more apparent, as the recent polemic around Dupont’s case focused on transness solely as an ideology without attending to transness in the clinic in any meaningful sense. As Dupont admits from the beginning, “We have nothing to say about trans people except, on a case by case basis.” And nonetheless, nothing meaningful is said about these cases by the Millerian wing of psychoanalysis which is further made inexcusable in light of the significant achievements made by analysts like Patricia Gherovici who engage with both trans ideology and transness in the clinic without compromising either concern. Ultimately, a certain unconscious skewing is made apparent by the deliberate polemic against transness by Millerian psychoanalysis focusing on trans ideology alone, as their pretext of neutrality only makes their partiality apparent.
organization ordered its members to abstain from political mobilizations against the instated fascist government.

Ultimately, the common thread is the accumulation of an excess to (Lacanian) psychoanalysis that one cannot help but address today, at a time when psychoanalytic tactics such as Miller’s have come to characterize the very sterile game that he has come to see in philosophy and radical politics. In dealing with the radical politicization of psychoanalysis from a geopolitical standpoint, this essay argues that psychoanalysis has to be capable to rethink and reembody itself with every contingent and immanent dislocations of its transcendental horizons. Through a reading of Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou on Mao Tse-Tung, we can think about the notion of dislocation and localization of the Idea. We will argue that this has historically happened in psychoanalysis in the transition from Freud to Lacan; however, the issue is that this dislocation has undergone a retroactivity of necessity which makes a vanishing mediator out of the contingent scrap of reality that it initially relied on—and this forms the quilting point of the contemporary Lacanian ideology. Through Gabriel Tupinambá’s *The Desire of Psychoanalysis*, we will inspect the notion of generic psychoanalysis. We will insist that while generic psychoanalysis is crucial for the refiguring of psychoanalytic politics in a dislocative matter, we need to take this outlook to the end onto a psychoanalysis that is willing to impurify itself through localization as this is the only psychoanalysis worthy of the name.

2. To dislocate psychoanalysis

When Mao states that “The basic error is mistrust of the peasants” in his “Critique of Stalin’s *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*” (1958/2007), Mao fundamentally disrupts commonplace assumptions with regards to the notion of the revolutionary class which is often relegated to the proletariat. With regards to the revolutionary subject, Mao’s dislocation of Marxism amounts to the question of the revolutionary subject with a gesture that says, yes, the proletariat, but also the peasants. Mao turns his attention to the significance of the peasant movement in China and how it shaped the prospects of a successful revolutionary movement there. After addressing prejudices made on peasantry, Mao (1971) states:

What the peasants are doing is absolutely right; what they are doing is fine! ‘It’s fine!’ is the theory of the peasants and of all other revolutionaries. Every revolutionary comrade should know that the national revolution requires a great change in the countryside. The Revolution of 1911 did not bring about this change, hence its failure. This change is now taking place, and it is an important factor for the completion of the revolution.
Every revolutionary comrade must support it, or he will be taking the stand of counter-revolution. (Tse-Tung, 1971, p. 28)

One can also note Lenin’s sympathies to the peasant as a revolutionary agent and the dislocation of the assumption of the proletariat under capitalism as the anchoring point of Marxism:

…to strive to lend the peasant movement the most revolutionary character by establishing the closest possible alliance between the West-European communist proletariat and the revolutionary peasant movement in the East, in the proletariat, and in backward countries in general. (Lenin, 1975c, p. 625)

The reception of this decision by Mao has had its fair share of polemics between Marxists who argue that Mao was a revisionist betraying the Marxist project and those who embraced Mao’s dislocation in reinvigorating the force of Third Worldist movements. As early as the Russian revolution, one can see Lenin responding to similar reproaches from the German Social-Democratic movement as “Left Wing” communisms placing abstract principles above the concretion in praxis that would get its hands dirty:

It will probably be no easy matter to devise a suitable form of compromise—but only a charlatan could promise the German workers and the German Communists an ‘easy’ road to victory… From all of this follows the necessity, the absolute necessity, for the Communist Party, the vanguard of the proletariat, its class-conscious section, to resort to changes of tack, to conciliation and compromises with the various groups of proletarians… (Lenin, 1975a, pp. 593-594)

In addition, Walter Rodney applauds this dislocative gesture with regards to its emancipatory promise for Pan-Africanism aiming towards revolution in a manner that reflects the latter response to dislocations. (Rodney, 2022). Ultimately, it is commonplace to regard Mao’s move as a corruption of Marxism although the evaluation of such a disruptive move may differ in accordance with the political interests of the evaluator—nonetheless, we would argue that such an evaluation is a corruption in it of itself whether wittily or unwittingly.

Such a predicament captivates the contemporary state of Lacanian psychoanalysis, as betrayals and corruptions shape the actuality of the Lacanian field today despite however much its proponents reassure us of the purity of their orthodoxy. And in this instance, we turn to Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou since they both wittingly embrace the corruption of Lacanianism, and they both offer some crucial commentary on the significance of the Maoist dislocation of Marxism.

Badiou is best understood in light of his systematic project in the *Being and Event* trilogy. At its core, Badiou’s claim is that there is truth. In *Being and Event* (2007), Badiou focuses on the universality of truth as a discontinuity that disrupts the totality of being by introducing something new into being through the event and its subjectivation in the procedures of art, politics, science, and love. *Logics of Worlds* (2009) provides a theory of the singularity of
truths as they are localized and appearing with the constructive logics of a determinate world as well as the subjective attitudes assumed as the event is processed. And *The Immanence of Truths* (2022) operates as a bridge between the universal and the singular to assert the absoluteness of truth whereby “philosophy’s task ever since its inception: to create, in the conditions of its time, the knowledge of the existential possibility of truth” (p. 590). The dislocative move captivated in the reiteration of politics in Mao can be accounted for in two instances of Badiou’s philosophy. In the terms of *Being and Event*, the excesses to Marxist orthodoxy come about by way of the subject of the peasant—once the peasant is named in the totality of the political situation, it becomes apparent that the neglect of the question of peasantry has now become the very thing that exceeds the situation of Marxist orthodoxy as Mao comes to note of the evental-site of peasant movement in Hunan (Badiou, 2007). In the terms of *Logics of Worlds*, we find a reactivation of the name of Marxism to make space for a truth to be resurrected. According to Badiou, there are four subjective attitudes to the event: fidelity, reactivity, obscuration, and resurrection. While reactivity denies the event and obscuration allows no space for the possibility of an event, fidelity actively engages in the production of events and resurrection reinvigorates the question of truth in light of its denial and obscuration (Badiou, 2009).

The crux of the Maoist dislocation can be appreciated in light of Badiou’s latter approach in *Logics of Worlds*, as he elaborates on these subjective positions through the invocations of the name “Spartacus.” Initially, Badiou articulates the attitude of fidelity whereby the invocation of the name of “Spartacus” comes to stand for a truth of politics around which enslaved gladiators organized a political body around: “We slaves, we want to and can return home.” By contrast, the reactionary response is articulated by the conservative slave who entertained minor improvements of their condition as enough, thus acknowledging the name “Spartacus” through its repression and avoidance of the organized political body. The obscurantist approach goes much further than a mere denial of the event, as it appeals to some totalized transcendental body that leaves no room for disruption such as a God or a naturalistic order where everyone has a set place therein. However, despite these attempts at denying and obscuring the truth of politics under the name “Spartakus,” Badiou highlights instances where the name is reactivated: in the emancipatory mobilization of Toussaint-Louverture against colonization and slavery in Haiti, where Toussaint-Louverture was called “black Spartacus,” as well as in the communist insurgency of Berlin by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg under the name of the “Spartakus League,” Thus, for Badiou, “a resurrection presupposes a new world, which generates the context for a new event, a new trace, a new body…” (Badiou 2009, 65). This dislocative resurrection is crucial for Badiou with regards to the transformations that Marxism has had to undergo, as he notes in *Metapolitics* (2006, p. 58):

…between Marx and Lenin there is a rupture and foundation rather than continuity and development. Equally, there is rupture between Stalin and Lenin, and between Mao and Stalin. Althusser represents yet another attempt at rupture. And what complicates
the picture even more is that all of these ruptures are themselves different in kind. All of which makes ‘Marxism’ the (void) name of an absolutely inconsistent set, once it is referred back, as it must be, to the history of political singularities.

Furthermore, Badiou argues that while this reflects a political series of events of absolutely inconsistent political projects, he would also push that something of absolute value in these movements:

…just as Robespierre and Saint-Just are the indices of the living part of the French Revolution, just as Toussaint Louverture is the index of the Haitian Revolution, Lenin the index of the Russian Revolution, and Castro that of the Cuban Revolution, Mao is the index of the Cultural Revolution. This, I must stress, is not a question of power and cult but of collective thought with an absolute, immortal value, although often, in its own historical time, defeated, as Robespierre and Mao certainly were. (Badiou, 2022, p. 585)

While Badiou distances himself from Hegel, we would argue that part of the issue at hand is the formulation of concrete universalities. This is exactly how Žižek interprets the dislocations of Marxism in Lenin and Mao in his introduction to Mao’s *On Practice and Contradiction* (2007). While it is an easy temptation for Marxists to find the true betrayal of the purest Marxism—which relies on a fantasy of a pure Marxism that externalizes all of its internal immanent contradictions that it contends with—instead we should endorse the dislocative move and embrace the distortion of Marxism. In fact, Žižek emphasizes the necessity of this contingent impurity that betrays the pristine image of Marxism as this is the only way that true universality is born: “…Christ needed Paul’s ‘betrayal’ in order for Christianity to emerge as a universal church… Marx needed Lenin’s ‘betrayal’ in order to enact the first Marxist revolution” (Žižek, 2007, p. 2). The point at hand is fundamentally Hegelian: yes, we can assert an abstract universality, but it will end up being utterly empty; thus, one negates the universality by way of particular concreteness, but this particularity will end up being just as aimless. Therefore, the concrete universality negates the negation in that the very thing that challenged the abstract universality was in fact the way to universality, as concrete universality hinges on a contingent scrap of reality which the particular stands for. As Žižek writes of concrete universality: “this radical transubstantiation through which the original theory has to reinvent itself in a new context: only by way of surviving this transplant can it emerge as effectively universal” (Žižek, 2007, p. 4).

Such a gesture of concrete universality is characterized in Marxism by Lenin, as he argues that:

In order to attain this aim, the contributors of *Pod Znamenem Marksikizma* must arrange for the systematic study of Hegelian dialectics from a materialist standpoint, i.e., the dialectics which Marx applied practically in his *Capital* and in his historical and political works, and applied to life and struggle of new classes in the East (Japan, India, and China)… every day of the awakening to life of new peoples and new classes serves
as a fresh confirmation of Marxism… Unless it sets itself such a task and systematically fulfill it, materialism cannot be militant materialism (Lenin, 1975b, p. 635).

Nonetheless, our troubles do not end here. As with each articulation of concrete universality, there is a risk of forgetting the contingency that it relied on to flesh itself out. This is explicitly stated in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977) where Hegel notes at the end that:

As its fulfillment… is the new existence, a new world and a new shape of Spirit. In the immediacy of the new existence has to start afresh to bring itself to maturity as if, for it, all that preceded were lost and it had learned nothing from the experience of the earlier Spirits… So although this Spirit starts afresh, and apparently from its own resources to bring itself to maturity, it is none the less on a higher level that it starts (pp. 492-493).

While the negation of the negation that fleshes out concrete universality comes with a fundamental change in the nature of universality, it may forget itself into the illusion of retroactivity at the other end of the vanishing point that has effaced the labour of the negative. At each dislocation of Marxism, we find a repetitive reiteration that moves us from contingency to necessity through a retroactive recoil, but this may forget the radically contingent scrap of reality that allowed necessity and universality to prop themselves up as concrete since this can be confused for a preordained and natural character (Žižek, 2014). This risk characterizes thequilting point of spirit and concrete universality, as the anchoring point from which it proceeds—the quilting point is like the name of “Spartacus” that ties together an organized body seeking emancipation just the same way that it may tie us together to an oppression that we have naturalized.

While we have focused our attention into the dislocations of Marxism throughout its history, we are nonetheless interested on its relevance for psychoanalysis’ own contentions with its betrayals. To begin with, these dislocations have already happened with the history of psychoanalysis. To the neo-Freudians and object-relation theorists, the betrayal happened with *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* marking the break between the positive psychoanalysis of early Freud onto the negative psychoanalysis of later Freud. To the IPA of the 1950s to the 1960s, the betrayal happened from Freud to Lacan as the question of training analysis and the end of analysis were complicated from the ego psychological tendency that aimed to mark the end of analysis through identification with the analyst’s ego as opposed to the Lacanian approach that introduced the symbolic and shifted the direction of analysis to the traversal of fantasy. To Jacques-Alain Miller, the Badiouanization and Žižekianization of Lacan as he decrives:

Mais la boîte de Pandore est ouverte depuis longtemps! Vous avez Zizek qui zizekise Lacan depuis qu’il a appris les rudiments de la doctrine jadis, à mon séminaire de DEA. Vous avez Badiou qui badiouise Lacan, et ce n’est pas joli joli. Il s’agirait plutôt de la

Tupinambá comments on this moment in recent Lacanian history and provides the following translation:

Pandora’s box has been opened for too long! We now have Žižek, who ‘Žižekianizes’ Lacan, using the rudiments of a doctrine that I have taught him in my seminar. We have Badiou, who ‘Badiouanizes’ Lacan, which is not good at all. It is time once again to close Pandora’s box… Laughs are over! As Lacan would say. (Tupinambá, 2021, pp. 13-14).

One cannot help but wonder if Miller realizes that perhaps this is not merely a corruption of Lacan, but a dislocation and transmission of psychoanalysis that have own up to their respective styles? This simply captivates a certain return to an identification with the analyst’s ego that Miller expects of Badiou and Žižek. In any case, it is apparent that the dislocations that we have inspected in Marxism can also be found in psychoanalysis. And much the same way that Marxism risks a naturalization of its contingency, the current state of Lacanian psychoanalysis risks the same in the form of the quilting point of Lacanian ideology through which it hits its historical limit (Tupinambá, 2021).

3. Generic psychoanalysis and Lacanian ideology

Gabriel Tupinambás The Desire of Psychoanalysis (2021) seeks to precisely address this operational limit in the horizon of Lacanian thinking, which is rather generic to the entire procedure than specific to either a problem in the clinic, a problem of metapsychology, or a problem in the psychoanalytic institution (p. 25). In line with Badiou, Tupinambá leans on Badiou’s formulation of thinking where thinking is “the non-dialectical or inseparable unity of a theory and a practice” (Badiou, 2003, p. 79). Badiou is interested with thinking as a zero-degree point between concepts and engagements, a moment when these lock onto one another as a truth-event. Philosophical thinking is ultimately the generic structuration of specific truth which is processed and operated upon by the truth-procedures of love, politics, science, and art (Badiou, 2007).

In the instance of the series of political procedures in the history of Marxism, each time that a specific truth is localized in a situation, there is also a generic structuration of this truth at work. Similarly, psychoanalysis localizes its truth operations and generates a structural limit to its field—in this sense, Tupinambá stresses the tension between Lacanian thinking and the limits of Lacanian ideology (Tupinambá, 2021). And Tupinambá masterfully localizes the origin of this Badiouian strategy in the debate in Cahiers pour l’Analyse between Alain
Badiou and Jacques-Alain Miller, whose stakes are summarized by Miller in his “Action of the Structure” (2012, p. 80) essay:

We know of two discourses of overdetermination: the Marxist discourse and the Freudian discourse. Since the first has today been liberated by Louis Althusser of the obstacle that burdened it with a conception of society as historical subject, just as the second has been liberated by Jacques Lacan from the interpretation of the individual as psychological subject—we think that is now possible to join these two discourses.

While the stakes of the debate are agreed upon to this extent, the terms from which Badiou and Miller proceed are significantly different. Tupinambá summarizes their positions when he highlights that Miller prioritizes the conjunction of Marxism and psychoanalysis into a given unity, whereas Badiou thinks that the compossibility of Marxism and psychoanalysis should take precedence in a manner that preserves their own respective interiorities (Miller, 2012; Tupinambá, 2021; Badiou, 2012).

This polemic is situated between Miller’s “Suture (Elements of the Logic of the Signifier)” (2012b) and Badiou’s response in “Mark and Lack: On Zero” (2012). In short, Miller generalizes the logic of signifier in psychoanalysis to intervene into the disputes found in the work of Gottlieb Frege on the logical foundations of mathematics in order to argue for the notion of the suture of the signifier as the effacing knotting of the possibility of logic:

Our purpose has been to recognize in the zero number the suturing stand-in for the lack… it functions as the excess which operates in the series of numbers, the subject. Its exclusion from the discourse which internally it intimates is suture. If we now determine the trait as the signifier, and ascribe to the number the position of the signified, the relation of lack to the trait should considered as the logic of the signifier (Miller, 2012, p. 99)

Therefore, Miller places a certain privileged priority to the logic of the signifier through the suture as something above both psychoanalysis and Marxism. Inadvertently, this amounts to a privileged position of psychoanalysis when the logic of the signifier is situated as the logic of the origin of logic, as this entails a certain sleight of hand that Badiou catches up to. In contrast to Miller, Badiou is certainly willing to entertain the notion of the suture to the extent as long as it is contained within its proper domain—thus, the generalization of the logic of the signifier to address the problematics of mathematics and logic is not only invalid, according to Badiou, but also unnecessary because Marx and Freud can be conjoined through their disjunction in manner that alludes to Badiou’s generic position in the Being and Event trilogy:

I only came to find the conceptual form of that tension once I understood that the most significant mathematical events might also provide the key to the subjective process of truths. This was the entire aim of Being and Event, crossing, through the concept of
genericity, of the mathematics of the pure multiple and the post-evental subjective trajectory that constructs a truth. (Hallward & Badiou, 2012, p. 280)

Furthermore, Tupinambá is correct to note that Badiou’s initial response only deflated Miller’s argument but had nothing to offer instead until The Concept of Model (1969/2007). Whereas the conjunctive disjunction from “Mark and Lack” sketches an approach to the problem, it is in The Concept of Model that Badiou stresses a crucial feature of mathematics that resists the Millerian subordination to the suture. As Tupinambá writes: “in mathematics, models relation different regions of the same general field: one area of mathematics models another—algebra can model parts of logic, just as geometry can model parts of algebra, and so on... absolutely homogenous… and partially heterogenous” (Tupinambá, 2021, p. 38).

Furthermore, the problem is not that Miller misunderstood Lacan, but that Badiou exposed a fundamental problem in Lacan’s own modelling of the relations in psychoanalysis (Tupinambá 2021, 52). As Badiou states, “Like Lacan’s accounts of Gödel’s theorem… Jacques-Alain Miller’s discussions of Frege and Boole are ambiguous in that they combine, simultaneously and indistinctly, what pertains to the effective construction of a logical mechanism with what pertains to the (ideological) discourse…” (Badiou 2012, 165). Interestingly enough, Slavoj Žižek expressed a similar evaluation of the polemic as the one that Tupinambá offered a decade after:

Against Badiou, we should insist on a ‘universal’ subject… There is, however, also a crucial limitation to Miller’s position, a limitation which, one might argue, is that of psychoanalysis as such… Unlike Miller, Badiou enables us to break out of this ennobled tragic cynicism… The difference is absolutely crucial today—it is the difference between social death and political life, between endorsing the dominant post-political cynicism and gathering the courage for a radical emancipatory engagement. (Žižek, 2012, pp. 166-167)

From this ambiguous outlook common to both Lacan and Miller, we find that the Lacanian ideology hinges on the unnecessary commitments assumed by the Lacanian cadre as their unwitting limit—and along with Žižek and Tupinambá, we insist that there is a brilliance to Lacanianism nonetheless, while our contentions are the ideological hang ups that resist the renewed dislocations of psychoanalysis at the levels of the clinic, theory, and institution (Tupinambá, 2021). To this extent, we agree with the significance of Tupinambá’s generic psychoanalysis as a psychoanalysis that does not fall to the clinical reductions of the unconscious separating psychoanalysis from medicine and psychiatry, and the critical reductions which set out the dialectical tension between philosophy and anti-philosophy (Tupinambá, 2021). When we look at the series of dislocations in the procedure

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3 Such an admixture that Badiou exposes here exposes Miller’s general strategy to politics, which is exemplar of his poor response to Paul Preciado’s polemic with more polemic as if it constituted anything other than the scandal he condemned.
of psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic thinking is generic in the diachronic sense of rewriting their rules as they go as well as generic in the synchronic sense of progressively including more and more heterogenous elements into the structural organization of psychoanalysis—thus diachronic in the sense of the analyst susceptible to analysis and the analysand who will analyze as well as synchronic in that becoming an analyst is generally open to anyone since becoming an analyst requires undergoing analysis (Tupinambá, 2021). In any case, Tupinambá’s generic psychoanalysis amounts to this: “Psychoanalytic thinking is generic because it is terminable and interminable, a set of finite processes that stitch together an infinite procedure” (Tupinambá, 2021, p. 117).

4. Conclusion: the way of impure psychoanalysis

Towards the later chapters of The Desire of Psychoanalysis, Tupinambá (2021) invites the prospect of an impure psychoanalysis as opposed to the generic psychoanalysis that he has formulated to address the relative limitations that psychoanalysis set upon itself through Lacan, Miller, and the logic of the signifier through what Tupinambá calls the regionalization of psychoanalysis. Then, so far Tupinambá has been able to elucidate a generic psychoanalysis as opposed to the regionalized limitations set in the Lacanian ideology; and through this intervention, Tupinambá invites us to consider the generic invariant of psychoanalysis as well as the regionalized variances of psychoanalysis. This is crucial, as Tupinambá states the wager as follows: “When one learns what is invariant in a given field, and what must logically remain the same in all possible cases, one also learns what could vary; that is, what the determinations are which have been mistakenly taken to be necessary pillars of this field’s consistency or rigor… thereby opening them to invention and consequential experimentation” (p. 122). Therefore, when we think about generic psychoanalysis and regionalized psychoanalysis, we are interested in the possibility of novelty that can dislocate psychoanalysis’ own artificial constraints by taking the limits of psychoanalysis itself for its object.

Under these terms, Tupinambá turns to the question of the finite, the infinite, and the transfinite in order to address how psychoanalysis could possibly be generic and regional in a manner that challenges the quasi-transcendentalization of the Lacanian ideology. From the outlook that concerns jouissance, we can see how Lacanian psychoanalysis traditionally limits the prospect of the infinite in the antimonic deadlocks of sexuation where unlimited jouissance is excluded in the inauguration of masculine sexuation and where unlimited jouissance is impossible to generalize in the instance of feminine sexuation. In either case, these two sexuated strategies deal with the logic of the signifier and its anchoring point in the phallus which render the infinite as inaccessible. For this reason, the Lacanian theory of sexuation offers an outlook of radical finitude and separation by problematizing the infinite through the figure of jouissance.

While the limitations set by the Lacanian approach offer a strong case of finitude that must be taken seriously, Tupinambá highlights how Lacan’s move that generalizes the finitude
inaugurated through the logic of the signifier is as invalid as that of Miller. The problem is not the finitude of sexuation and the logic of the signifier in it of itself since this has an operative significance for the Lacanian procedure within its proper domain; but rather the problem rests in the absolutization of this finitude without recognizing that this finitude remains a relative property. As Tupinambá notes through mathematical genericity: “…mathematical inaccessibility is a relative property—it concerns the enclosure of an original domain and what operations we allow within it—it is not an absolute relation between a discernible domain and an absolutely removed and indeterminate term” (p. 168). Thus, in relativizing the enclosure of the Lacanian horizon, it makes sense why one cannot simply move from the finite to the infinite; and thus, we need a new axiomatic intervention to displace this limit point in psychoanalysis, since we are not merely naming something within the domain of its finitude, but rather introducing the transfinite proper insofar as it allows us “to show that a series of new rules, problems, and structures follow from the novelties that follow from applying unions, exponentiations, correspondences, and other operations, to infinite sets” (p. 173). In other words, the difference introduced through the transfinite is one that opens up a new possibility for the modeling and re-embodiment of psychoanalysis as it reorganizes itself to become operative yet again.

Ultimately, Tupinambá’s formulation of generic and regionalized psychoanalysis is crucial for grasping at the dislocations of psychoanalysis that accumulate and exceed the delimitations of the Lacanian ideology. And while Tupinambá provides a sketch of regionalized psychoanalysis, we think it is crucial to push further on this direction where we embrace the impurity of psychoanalysis.

Since we have thought about the dislocative move in the Hegelian terms of the concrete universal, it will also serve us to consider the transfinite of regionalized psychoanalysis. While the sequence of events in psychoanalysis has allowed us to apprehend generic psychoanalysis as an idea of metapsychology, the regionalized modelling of metapsychology may forget its own contingent evental sequences and overextend itself into generality beyond its proper domain. Even worse, in the retroactive illusion of the necessity of its model, it may occlude the very idea of the possibility of another psychoanalysis through its own operative constraints—while Tupinambá reminds us of this, let us not forget that Lacan himself highlighted this with regards to his reconstruction of Freud beyond its own operative constraints relying on energetics, mythology, anthropology, and the like as the move from the mytheme to the matheme makes apparent in shifting the delimitation of the thinkable in psychoanalytic thought. Now we must do Lacan the same honour with our own dislocation, and it is imperative to own up to the Badiounizations, Žižekianizations, and even the Millerianisms for what they are in their regionalization and as they demarcate the thoughts that psychoanalytic thinking can think.

Indeed, and unwittingly, this is where Miller remains within the proper domain of his suture. If Miller engages with his own regionalization for what it is, then one can appreciate the value of his own transplantation of Lacan. If Miller overdetermines psychoanalysis again through the suture and the logic of the signifier, then of course he does not know any better.
that he can be placed in the same plane as Badiou and Žižek. Thus, Miller is wrong for the very reason that he is right—which is to say that we certainly need something more than a generic psychoanalysis, as we need a regionalized psychoanalysis ready to impurify itself; but for this to be worth something, psychoanalysis must know that it is itself that impurity, and Miller fails in this respect. In this instance, we recall Hegel’s phrase with regards to absolute spirit, insofar it is spirit that knows itself to be so. But the irony is not contained to Miller’s placement along the same plane of regionalization as Badiou and Žižek; it goes as far as placing Miller in the same plane as Paul B. Preciado.

When Preciado concludes Can the Monster Speak? with an invitation to the project of a mutant psychoanalysis, Preciado’s gesture is precisely the impurification of psychoanalysis through its regionalization in a manner that it shifts the paradigmatic assumptions of a certain epistemology of sex, gender, and sexual difference from their totalization in a retroactive illusion of necessity—which Preciado characterizes as totalitarian (Preciado, 2021). Preciado’s analogy for what we have been describing as the limiting localization and the dislocative is expressed through the figure of transitioning: whereas a rigid sexual difference limits the perception, feeling, and loving that pertains to that difference, transitioning is the overcoming of these limits as its own (Preciado, 2021). But this impurification of psychoanalysis is not as clean and simple as it may seem, as the call to impurify psychoanalysis will arrive yet again. Following Preciado’s figure of transitioning, one is moving from one cage to another cage through one’s own initiative (Preciado, 2021). This recalls Gherovici’s and Lacan’s reference to Tiresias as the patron saint of psychoanalysis, who became a prophet after changing sexes twice (Gherovici, 2017; Lacan, 2014). Thus, while Miller is in the same plane as Preciado in the regionalization of psychoanalysis, Preciado at least acknowledges himself to be so in a manner that transness captives the transfinite.

Where we push Preciado further is from the outlook the generic lesson for psychoanalysis insofar as psychoanalysis itself is a mutant psychoanalysis worthy of the name—the crux of the difference is whether it knows itself to be so or not. The turn from the finite to the infinite through the transfinite is best captivated through the figures of absolute idea in Hegel and the death drive in Lacan. As Todd McGowan describes of both of these figures realizing their own infinitude in Enjoying What We Don’t Have (2013, p. 284):

…we can transform our relationship to the impediments that block the full realization of our drive. We can see the impediments as the internal product of the death drive rather than as an external limit…at once infinite and limited… The concept attains its infinitude not through the endless progress towards a point that always remains beyond and out of reach but through including the beyond as a beyond within itself… That is to say, the concept transforms an external limit into an internal one and thereby becomes
both infinite and finite. The infinitude of the concept is nothing but the concept’s own self-limitation. The enjoyment that the death drive produces also achieves its infinitude through self-limitation.

This is ultimately the crux of a regionalized psychoanalysis that is attentive to its generic implications, it is a psychoanalysis that knows itself to be so and makes its own limits into its object. Like Tiresias as the truth beyond life and death, as for Tiresias we must offer our own living substance in tarrying with the impurity of dislocation, of changing sexes, and of changing psychoanalysis as we learn to die the most appropriate deaths that set out its own finite horizon and the negativity that animates it to operate its procedure—is this not the essence of Tupinambá’s desire of psychoanalysis?

While the evocation of generic psychoanalysis suspends our commitments to a given regionalized psychoanalysis and the model of its procedure which it has retroactively convinced itself of its necessity; we must push generic psychoanalysis to the end in the remodeling form of a regionalized psychoanalysis, a mutant psychoanalysis, and an impure psychoanalysis in a manner that this is psychoanalysis itself. If Tiresias is the patron saint of psychoanalysis, we must go further and say that Tiresias is the sinthome of psychoanalysis whereby the generic subtraction of psychoanalysis is willing to impurify itself again through creative remodeling, experimentation, and inventions that acknowledge their generational and generic stakes.

References


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